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I. INTRODUCTION 
In January 2009, the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) released a 71-page glossy report entitled “Moving 
Forward: Driving Investment and Innovation While Protecting 
Consumers”2 appraising Kevin Martin’s four years as chairman 
of the FCC.3 The report makes the claim that, in 2007, the FCC 
acted to implement a competitive market for set-top boxes 
(STB), the in-home electronic devices that control customers’ 
cable TV connections.4 As a result, “consumers may [now] pur-
chase a box of their choice instead of having to lease equipment 
from their cable providers.”5 The FCC sought to establish that 
its regulatory effort—which kicked off with mandates in the 
1996 Telecommunications Act and has generated no fewer than 
20 FCC notices and over 6,000 comments and replies6—has 
paid dividends, opening up valuable new choices for consumers. 
In fact, the marketplace touted by regulators has failed to 
materialize: today virtually all households subscribing to cable 
                                                          
 2. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, MOVING FORWARD: DRIVING INVESTMENT 
AND INNOVATION WHILE PROTECTING CONSUMERS (2009), [hereinafter 
MOVING FORWARD], available at http://www.fcc.gov/fcc-moving-forward-
report.pdf. 
 3. Martin was the second of two FCC Chairs appointed by President 
George W. Bush. The first, Michael Powell, headed the Commission from 2001 
to 2005. Martin’s tenure spanned 2005 to 2009. Former FCC Chairman Kevin 
J. Martin: Biography, FED. COMM.  COMMISION, 
http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/previous/martin/biography.html (last up-
dated Jan. 28, 2009); Former FCC Chairman Michael K. Powell: Biography, 
FED. COMM. COMMISSION, 
http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/previous/powell/biography.html (last up-
dated Mar. 18, 2005). 
 4. MOVING FORWARD, supra note 2, at 25. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Electronic Comment Filing System, FED COMM. COMMISSION, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/proceeding/view?z=v0oml&name=97-80 (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2010). 
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TV rent STBs from their service provider.7 The logic of the re-
forms was that subscribers, faced with a standalone (“unbun-
dled”) STB choice, would head to Best Buy or Wal-Mart to buy 
better equipment from competing retail vendors.8 Moreover, 
these competitive options would enable new content and appli-
cations to flow to the household, bypassing cable operator “ga-
tekeepers.”9 This rule would trigger an “evolution of the market 
for navigation devices so that they become generally and com-
petitively available through commercial retail outlets.”10 Yet, 
despite implementation of the FCC’s regulations, and self-
congratulatory public statements, that market has not 
emerged.11 
This failure is, in less glossy reports, the assessment of the 
FCC itself. In the Commission’s words, the CableCARD tech-
nology developed to facilitate modular conformity of competing 
devices has “failed to stimulate a competitive retail market for 
set-top boxes.”12 The top two cable STB manufacturers in North 
America, Motorola and Cisco, both supply their STBs through 
cable providers and account for an estimated ninety-five per-
cent of the units’ shipments over the first three quarters in 
2009.13 In contrast, “there are 0.5 million CableCARDS dep-
loyed in retail devices today, which represent approximately 1% 
of all set-top boxes deployed in cable homes.”14 There are only 
two manufacturers, TiVo and Moxi, that “continue to sell Cab-
leCARD-enabled set-top boxes through retail outlets.”15 
The experience of the FCC’s attempt to create a “policy-
induced competition” is important on its own and for its more 
                                                          
 7. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL 
BROADBAND PLAN 18 (2010), [hereinafter CONNECTING AMERICA], available at 
http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf. 
 8. See id. at 50 (stating that congress added Section 629 to the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996 to stimulate competition in set-top boxes). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, First Report and Order, 13 
FCC Rcd. 14775, at 14780, para. 13 (1998) [hereinafter Implementation]. 
 11. CONNECTING AMERICA, supra note 7, at 18. 
 12. CONNECTING AMERICA, supra note 7, at 50. See also Nate Anderson, 
FCC Admits CableCARD a Failure, Vows to Try Something Else, ARS 
TECHNICA (Dec. 4, 2010, 11:38 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2009/12/fcc-admits-cablecard-a-failure-vows-to-try-something-
else.ars. 
 13. CONNECTING AMERICA, supra note 7, at 50. 
 14. Id. at 51 (citation omitted). 
 15. Id. 
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general implications. In many services, particularly in tele-
communications, regulators have sought to restrict vertical in-
tegration so as to leave complements free to compete. Classical-
ly, this was the approach in the old Bell System following the 
Carterfone mandate, which allowed non-AT&T equipment—
notably, telephones and switches—to access standard interfac-
es as plug-in devices.16 The result was that, even while phone 
networks maintained monopoly services for voice and data 
transport, competitive rivalry developed with respect to net-
work-connected devices.17 
Of course, the regulated monopoly featured in the old 
AT&T (“Ma Bell”) system yielded economic incentives distinct 
from those in other markets, posing challenges for regulators 
specific to the industry.18 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
statutorily ended, for all practical purposes, regulation of cable 
TV rates.19 The subscription video market has also become in-
creasingly competitive as satellite and phone providers have 
emerged as direct rivals of cable companies, thereby limiting 
profit margins.20 Moreover, whatever the gains from the expan-
sion of equipment markets in the wake of Carterfone, competi-
tive entry in telephones did not generally create competition for 
underlying network services.21 That development had to wait 
for inter-modal competition offered by cable TV operators (for 
fixed services) and cellular networks (for fixed-to-mobile substi-
tution).22 That is a key fact, given that the incentive for an un-
                                                          
 16. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C. 2d 
420, 420–421 (1968); Teferent Leasing Corp., 45 F.C.C. 2d 204, 205 (1974), 
aff’d sub nom. N.C. Util. Comm’n v. F.C.C., 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976); Me-
bane Home Tele. Co., 53 F.C.C. 2d 473, 473–475 (1975), aff'd sub nom. Me-
bane Home Tele. Co. v. FCC, 535 F.2d 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 17. Faulhaber, supra note 1, at 73, 79, 96. 
 18. See Marius Schwartz, The Economic Logic for Conditioning Bell Entry 
into Long Distance on the Prior Opening of Local Markets, 18 J. REG. ECON. 
247, 261–266 (Nov. 2000) (explaining the incentives of entering the local and 
long distance phone markets). 
 19. John Allen Hendricks, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: Its Im-
pact on the Electronic Media of the 21st Century, 21 COMM. & L. 39, 48 (1999). 
See also General Cable Television Industry and Regulation Fact Sheet, FED. 
COMM. COMMISSION (June 2000), http://www.fcc.gov/mb/facts/csgen.html. 
 20. Thomas Hazlett & Dennis Weisman, Market Power in U.S. Broadband 
Services 20–21 (George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 09-69, 2009), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1525568##. 
 21. See id. 
 22. Dan Brenner, Creating Effective Broadband Network Regulation, 62 
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regulated service provider to anti-competitively foreclose a ver-
tical service rival focuses on protection of the underlying mar-
ket.23 
Despite these facts, as well as the distinctions of AT&T’s 
regulated monopoly, suggestions have been made recently to 
impose vertical limits, à la Carterfone, in a variety of markets. 
These include a “Wireless Carterfone” by Tim Wu24 and a pro-
posal for extensive network sharing obligations on U.S. broad-
band providers in an FCC-commissioned study produced in 
2009 by Harvard Law School’s Berkman Center.25 Given these 
policy arguments and others similar in nature, it is important 
to evaluate the evidence gleaned from instances in which regu-
lators have already sought to impose such rules. STBs are one 
prime area not yet addressed in the academic literature. 
This paper proceeds in the following way: In Section II, we 
discuss the general issue of vertical integration, considering the 
efficiency and foreclosure theories describing marketplace out-
comes. In Section III we trace the path of FCC STB rules from 
1996 through 2009. Section IV then evaluates this regulatory 
strategy. Section V presents evidence regarding the market re-
sults of the FCC STB rules and includes a historical account of 
the parallel evolution of satellite TV STBs, where an unbun-
dled product market evolved into a vertically integrated struc-
ture due to market forces. A summary and conclusion is offered 
in Section VI. 
II. EFFECTS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
Section 629 (then section 304) of the Telecommunications 
Act was enacted to create a “proconsumer”26 environment that 
                                                          
FED. COMM. L. J. 13, 42–43 (2010). 
 23. See James C. Cooper, Luke M. Froeb, Dan O’Brien & Michael G. Vita, 
Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 
639, 641 (2005) (suggesting that a vertically integrated market power capable 
of raising prices to un-integrated rivals would necessarily avoid double-
markup distortions and thus increase consumer welfare). 
 24. Tim Wu, Wireless Carterfone, 1 INT'L J. COMM. 389, 391 (2007), 
http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/view/152/96. 
 25. Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y, Next Generation Connectivity: A 
Review of Broadband Internet Transitions, and Policy from Around the World 
83 (Oct. 2009) (unpublished report), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/stage/pdf/Berkman_Center_Broadband_Study_13Oct09.pdf. 
 26. 142 CONG. REC. 1170 (1996) (statement of Rep. Edward Markey); Im-
plementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Petition 
for Rulemaking of Public Knowledge, et al, 13 (2009) [hereinafter Petition for 
Rulemaking], available at 
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will be “designed to make cable equipment cheaper and easier 
to use for all consumers.”27 In the legislators’ views, consumers 
were “tired of paying rent for cable converter boxes and strug-
gling with multiple clickers for the TV set-top box and their 
video machines.”28 We are now able, given enactment of this 
“proconsumer” policy, to evaluate its effectiveness. 
A. FIRM BOUNDARIES 
Bundling services, such as when cable STBs are rented as 
part of the cable TV service, is a form of vertical integration.29 
At a general level, vertical integration is ubiquitous and effi-
ciency-enhancing.30 Firms do not attempt to minimize the 
number of inputs that they own; rather, they optimize to reduce 
costs, mixing complementary assets within the firm.31 Even the 
smallest restaurant or grocery store owns a considerable pro-
portion of the resources it employs in providing retail services. 
Furthermore, as Steven Cheung has pointed out, the lines be-
tween what is internal and what is external to the firm become 
blurred by the use of contracts: when the restaurant pays the 
cook an hourly wage or a weekly salary, are the hours worked 
internal to the firm?32 While the firm does not own the cook, it 
does claim rights to the labor produced by the cook. To that ex-
tent, the restaurant vertically integrates into cooking even as it 
contracts for labor inputs supplied by non-owners. 
It is important to start at this basic level. Where vertical 
                                                          
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020354735. 
 27. 142 CONG. REC. 2016 (1996) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). See 
also Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 26. 
 28. 142 CONG. REC. 2016 (1996) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). 
 29. Robert E. McCormick, William F. Shughart II & Robert D. Tollison, A 
Theory of Commodity Bundling in Final Product Markets: Professor Hirshlei-
fer Meets Professor Becker, 26 INT’L REV L & ECON. 162, 164 (2006). 
 30. Id. at 163 (“Commodity bundling is pervasive. From a McDonald’s 
Happy Meal® to personal computers preloaded with an operating system, a 
web browser and a media player, consumers are confronted daily with take-it-
or-leave-it offers requiring them to purchase bundles of products preassembled 
for them or nothing at all.”). 
 31. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 391–
392, 395 (1937) (suggesting that firms will naturally organize themselves to 
rely on transactions with other firms as little as possible to avoid contract 
costs, and expand vertically until it is no longer practical to do so). See also 
Steven Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 1, 18 
(1983) (expanding on Coase’s theory of the vertical expansion of firms). 
 32. Cheung, supra note 31, at 10–12, 17. 
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integration is seen, ipso facto, as evidence of anti-competitive 
conduct, general perspective has been lost.33 In his initial for-
mulation, Coase followed the intuition that companies produce 
internally when it is efficient to do so.34 When inputs can be 
less expensively provided by outside suppliers, the firm will na-
turally seek to use the “price system” to purchase these prod-
ucts rather than supplying them internally.35 Efficiencies of 
vertical integration are seized in the quest for competitive su-
periority. 
Efficiencies can even be realized in situations where inter-
nal costs of production equal external supply costs by reducing 
transactions costs, including those emanating from double 
marginalization (effectively eliminating the exercise of market 
power by a supplier) or the cost of contracting.36 The imperfec-
tion of contracts in aligning economic incentives may permit 
producers of complementary inputs to opportunistically hold-up 
their fellow suppliers in the production chain, appropriating 
rents.37 Vertical integration is seen to remedy this problem, en-
couraging productive investments.38 Alternatively, a firm may 
integrate to foreclose rivals, increasing profits via anticompeti-
tive behavior. The strategy relies on creating barriers to entry 
(in either the upstream or downstream market) by increasing 
the scale and scope of new competitors.39 In certain circums-
tances, this restricts output and raises quality-adjusted prices 
paid by consumers.40 While early ACF theories were not well-
formulated,41 more recent analysis has offered profit-
maximizing rationales.42 Empirical research has not, however, 
                                                          
 33. Cooper et al., supra note 23, at 241 (demonstrating the fragility of us-
ing vertical integration to show anticompetitive equilibria). 
 34. Coase, supra note 31, at 395. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Cheung, supra note 31, at 4. 
 37. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF 
CAPITALISM 199–200 (1985) (giving petroleum suppliers and buyers as an ex-
ample of suppliers charging entry fees and penalties to buyers in exchange for 
initial and continuing supply). 
 38. See id. at 88–89 (showing that as inter-firm relations approach vertic-
al integration, hazards that lead to nonproduction are eliminated). 
 39. Cooper et al., supra note 23, at 642–43. 
 40. See id. at 648 (citing a study in which vertical integration in the cable 
industry raised consumer prices). 
 41. ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 16 (1978). 
 42. See Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration 
and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation 
in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 103 (2003). 
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produced much evidence of anti-competitive vertical integra-
tion.43 
B. EFFICIENCY V. FORECLOSURE 
Despite this lack of evidence, vertical integration was his-
torically viewed as suspicious by antitrust scholars who saw 
such forms of organization as motivated by the desire to create 
barriers to entry.44 The idea was that, if a manufacturer bought 
a retail distributor, the services of the retailer were “foreclosed” 
—competing manufacturers would no longer be able to sell 
their products through stores now owned by its product rival.45 
Until the 1970s, the Supreme Court shared this perspective. In 
1956 the Court struck down a vertical merger that was alleged-
ly foreclosing a negligible percentage of the market.46 In the 
1961 case Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the Court invali-
dated a vertical merger that allegedly foreclosed 5% and 1% of 
the respective market.47 A decade later, Ford Motor Co. v. Unit-
ed States struck down a vertical merger involving 10% of the 
market.48 
Starting in the 1970s a new understanding began to 
emerge.49 Economists critically evaluated the theory on which 
vertical integration foreclosed competition, finding it arithmeti-
cally deficient.50 Whatever existing retail capacity was captured 
by a manufacturer via merger would be offset by the retail ca-
pacity “opened” to rivals as the manufacturer shifted its sales 
to the integrated sales channel.51 Moreover, the leveraging of 
                                                          
 43. See Cooper, et al., supra note 23, at 641 (suggesting that a vertically 
integrated market power capable of raising prices to unintegrated rivals would 
necessarily avoid double-markup distortions and thus increase consumer wel-
fare). 
 44. See JOE BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 155–56 (1956) (arguing 
that there are few industries in which vertical integration would be necessary 
for legitimate cost-cutting purposes). 
 45. Id. at 16. 
 46. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593, 
607–08 (1956). 
 47. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 343–44 (1961). 
 48. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 578 (1971); id. at 589 
(Berger, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 49. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 
U. PA. L. REV. 925, 931–32 (1979) (suggesting that in the 1970s traditional in-
dustrial organization began to lose credibility). 
 50. Id. at 932. 
 51. Id. at 936. 
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market power, expanding monopoly upstream or downstream, 
was shown to be uncompelling.52 In the standard case, there is 
only one monopoly profit per end product, and profits are max-
imized if complementary products are sold at competitive pric-
es.53 Efforts by a monopolist to vertically expand do not, in this 
case, increase monopoly power but lead to efficiencies—as the 
integration is undertaken to bring prices of complements (or 
inputs) to competitive levels.54  As noted, some foreclosure pos-
sibilities remain, even if these are tied to pre-emption of hori-
zontal rivalry—vertical integration serving as a means of rais-
ing rivals’ costs.55 
Economic studies strongly tend to support the proposition 
that vertical integration aids efficiency rather than foreclosure. 
As a comprehensive 2005 survey finds: 
• Most studies find vertical integration precompetitive; 
• Efficiency is often attributed to eliminating double-
markups or cost savings; 
• Studies find evidence consistent with “dealer services”  
efficiencies; 
• It is difficult to find cases where vertical controls are 
unambiguously anticompetitive.56 
C. VERTICAL RELATIONS IN THE MARKET FOR SET-TOP BOXES 
AND EFFICIENCIES DERIVED FROM INTERNALIZATION OF 
TRANSACTION COSTS 
Some argue that cable companies leverage market power 
in video services to extract monopoly charges for STBs via 
monthly rental fees.57 This leaves unexplained why cable oper-
ators do not simply extract such sums in cable service fees, 
which, given the operators’ market power, can be set to include 
whatever surcharge would otherwise be imposed on STBs. In 
                                                          
 52. See id. at 935 (suggesting that the cost of expanding and maintaining  
monopolies vertically is greater than the costs of transacting with upstream 
and downstream monopolies). 
 53. See id. at 934 (introducing the Chicago analysis’ belief that price dis-
crimination by a monopoly will move output to competitive levels). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Bain, supra note 44. 
 56. Cooper, et al., supra note 23, at 658. 
 57. Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 26, at 12–14 (arguing that con-
sumers must rent set-top boxes for more than it would cost to buy them be-
cause of the monopoly cable companies hold in the set-top box market). See 
also CONNECTING AMERICA, supra note 7, at 50–51 (explaining the monopoly 
service providers have in set-top boxes). 
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short, if every subscriber needs a cable STB, then the cable 
monopolist does not obtain new market power by charging cus-
tomers for the bundle (service + set-top box), as opposed to ser-
vice alone. Indeed, the most likely explanation of STB fees is 
that they allow the cable operator to lower prices to price-
elastic (perhaps low-income) customers who may restrict their 
TV viewing to one TV set (and STB), while charging less price-
sensitive (presumably higher-income) households higher prices 
via multiple STB rentals.58 This may be seen as a price discrim-
ination scheme, but its effect is typically to increase output and 
reduce the inefficiency of whatever market power is enjoyed in 
the cable market.59 Moreover, such pricing invigorates competi-
tive entry; to the extent that new rivals can anticipate such 
marketing models, market forces supporting competitive entry 
are intensified.60 
Questions are raised about why cable companies lease, ra-
ther than sell, STBs to customers.61 Some view the practice as a 
way for the cable companies to obtain disproportionate returns 
from cable customers.62 Yet, almost all other multichannel vid-
eo programming distributions (MVPD), including direct-
broadcast satellite (DBS) and Internet protocol television 
(IPTV) providers, rely on a similar business model.63 The capi-
tal costs are absorbed by the network provider; subscribers pay 
monthly charges to amortize both these costs and general net-
work overhead.64 Competitive mobile phone providers also 
                                                          
 58. McCormick et al., supra note 29, at 177. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Posner, supra note 49, at 934. 
 61. 142 CONG. REC. 2016 (1996) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). See 
also Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 26 (asking “that the Commission in-
itiate a rulemaking to address the lack of competition in the video device mar-
ket”). 
 62. E.g., 142 CONG. REC. 2016 (1996) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) 
(complaining that consumers have no choice but to pay for high-end equip-
ment while actually receiving antiquated equipment). 
 63. E.g., English Packages, DIRECTV, 
http://www.directv.com/DTVAPP/new_customer/base_packages.jsp? (last vi-
sited Sept. 30, 2010). 
 64. See e.g., AT&T U-verse Packages, AT&T, http://www.att.com/u-
verse/shop/index.jsp?rel=nofollow&wtSlotClick=1-00477W!901481-1-
1#fbid=a4UCh2JyDGc (last visited Nov. 21, 2010); Direct TV Prices, DIRECTV, 
http://www.directstartv.com/directv/directv_pricing.html (last visited Nov. 21, 
2010); Packages and Plans, VERIZON, 
http://www22.verizon.com/Residential/FiOSTV/Plans/Plans.htm (last visited 
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structure network and handset capital costs largely the same 
way, with subscribers paying equipment costs in the form of 
monthly access fees and per-minute charges over the life of 
their contract.65 
III. FCC SET-TOP BOX REGULATIONS AND THE MVPD 
MARKET 
A. CABLE SET-TOP BOXES AND THE ADVENT OF REGULATION 
A set-top box is a device that connects a stream of video 
signals, in this case delivered via a cable or satellite television 
provider, to a subscriber’s television set.66 The box then con-
trols channel selection, usually via a short-range wireless 
command sent by the viewer via a remote control device.67 Most 
STBs used today also feature a “return path,” meaning that, in 
addition to video content flowing from the cable TV head-end to 
the subscriber’s household, the household can send signals to 
the head-end.68 In the language of the 1996 Telecommunica-
tions Act, cable STBs are “navigation devices.”69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
Nov. 21, 2010); Satellite TV Program & Digital TV Packages, DISH NETWORK, 
http://www.dishnetwork.com/packages/programming/default.aspx (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2010). 
 65. E.g., Family Share Plans, VERIZON WIRELESS, 
http://www.verizonwireless.com:80/b2c/splash/planfamily.jsp (last visited Sept. 
30, 2010). 
 66. Set-Top Box, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Set-top_box (last 
modified Sept. 16, 2010). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Detailed Explanation of Set Top Boxes, THE INTERACTIVE TELEVISION 
DICTIONARY AND BUSINESS INDEX, http://www.itvdictionary.com/set-
top_box.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2010). 
 69. FCC’s use of the term “navigation devices” means converter boxes, in-
teractive equipment, and other equipment used by consumers within their 
premises to receive multichannel video programming and other services of-
fered over multichannel video programming systems. Implementation, supra 
note 10, at 14776 n.1. 
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Exhibit 1. Use of a Cable Set-Top Box 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 directed the FCC to 
[A]dopt regulations to assure the commercial availability . . . of con-
verter boxes, interactive communications equipment, and other 
equipment used by consumers to access multichannel video pro-
gramming and other services offered over multichannel video pro-
gramming systems, from manufacturers, retailers, and other vendors 
not affiliated with any multichannel video programming distribu-
tor.70 
A primary obstacle to customer purchases of boxes sup-
plied by third parties was in the security and authentication 
features of the box.71 Cable TV systems are designed as “bus 
systems,”72 meaning that all the video services supplied by the 
cable operator are loaded at the system head-end and carried 
everywhere with different services “disembarking” at those 
                                                          
 70. 47 U.S.C. § 549 (2006). 
 71. Implementation, supra note 10, at 14776 para. 4. 
 72. Satellite systems are similarly designed, with the obvious difference 
that the “bus” is wireless. 
 
TV Set 
Cable Signal 
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points where paying customers are connected.73 That is, all 
electronic content flows from the cable head-end on wires pass-
ing every customer’s (and potential customer’s) home; it then 
flows to individual household “drops” based on information as 
to which homes subscribe and what services they are entitled to 
receive.74 This information is embedded in STBs. If subscribers 
are to buy these devices from companies other than the cable 
operator, there has to be some standard mechanism for insert-
ing subscriber data into the equipment.75 
In 1998, the FCC instituted an “integration ban” requiring 
MVPDs to separate their conditional access and security data 
from other functions in the STB, also known as a “host de-
vice.”76 The initial deadline was July 1, 2000.77 This was in-
tended to allow manufacturers and retailers to sell host devices 
to consumers while allowing MVPDs to maintain control over 
their content.78 This policy was a form of structural separation, 
although cable operators would still be allowed to market STBs 
to customers as part of their video service.79 
Subsequently, the FCC established January 1, 2005 as the 
new deadline for compliance with the integration ban.80 The 
FCC extended this deadline to July 1, 2007 at the request of 
cable operators, allowing them additional time to determine the 
feasibility of developing a downloadable security function that 
would permit compliance with the Commission’s rules.81 Were 
such a software product to become available, it would presuma-
bly lower the costs of the integration ban relative to the alter-
native—using separate hardware devices (one for user authori-
zation, one for channel selection).82 
                                                          
 73. The Definition of Headend, THE INTERACTIVE TELEVISION DICTIONARY 
AND BUSINESS INDEX, http://www.itvdictionary.com/definitions/headend_head-
end_head_end_definition.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2010). 
 74. Id. 
 75. CableCARD, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CableCARD#Technical_overview (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2010). 
 76. 63 F.R. 38089-01, 38090 (1998). 
 77. Id. 
 78. “No Commission action in this proceeding should be construed to au-
thorize or justify any use, manufacture, or importation of equipment that 
would violate Section 633 of the Communications Act or any other provision of 
law precluding the unauthorized reception of MVPD service.” Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Implementation, supra note 10, at 14803 para. 69. 
 81. 47 C.F.R. § 76.1204(a)(1) (2010). 
 82. Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
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In December 2002, the cable and consumer electronics in-
dustries adopted a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that 
reflected a compromise agreement to integrate the navigation 
functionality of STBs into television receivers as part of the dig-
ital television transition.83 In January 2003, the FCC issued 
the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPR) seeking 
comments on the MOU and the proposed “plug and play”84 ca-
ble compatibility standard. This standard would allow consum-
ers to directly attach their “digital cable ready” television re-
ceivers to cable systems and receive one-way cable television 
services without the need for an external navigation device.85 
In April 2003, the FCC requested the cable and consumer elec-
tronics industries to provide status reports on their negotia-
tions for bidirectional digital cable receivers and products at 90, 
180, and 270 day intervals.86 After the submission of the last 
status report to the Commission, the public was given 30 days 
to submit comments. 
In October 2003, the FCC issued the Second Report and 
Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, im-
plementing the technical rules proposed as part of the MOU 
with some modifications.87 In the follow-up Report and Order 
issued on March 17, 2005, the FCC investigated the state of the 
navigation device market and concluded that the state of the 
competition in the navigation devices market as of that date 
was not sufficient to assure the commercial availability of such 
devices.88 The FCC cited contentions from Motorola and Scien-
                                                          
Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Second Report and Order, 20 
FCC Rcd. 6794, 6810 para. 31 (2005) [hereinafter Implementation 2]. 
 83. See Letter from Carl E. Vogel, President and CEO, Charter Commc’ns, 
et al., to Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC (Dec. 19, 2002), available at 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=6513399175. 
 84. The FCC’s proposed “plug and play” rules were aiming to allow con-
sumers to receive cable programming without the need of a STB. Implementa-
tion 2, supra note 82, at 6797 para. 9. Hence, the cable would plug directly into 
the TV set without need for a STB. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Order and Further Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 7924, at 7926 para. 5  (2003). 
 87. Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: 
Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Second Report and Order and 
Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 20885, at 20891 
para. 10 (2003). 
 88. Implementation 2, supra note 82, at 6794 para 2. 
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tific Atlanta that they had attempted to negotiate deals with 
retailers to purchase and market STBs but received little to no 
retailer interest.89 The Consumer Electronics Retailers Coali-
tion (CERC), a trade group representing retailers, argued that 
even were STBs independently retailed, MVPDs would place 
obstacles in the path of competitive entrants.90 
The FCC continued to press the integration ban. The cable 
industry challenged this policy in three separate petitions to 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, each of which was denied.91 
In limited circumstances, cable operators are eligible for waiv-
ers, to be granted where the FCC finds it “necessary to assist 
the development or introduction of a new or improved multi-
channel video programming or other service offered over multi-
channel video programming systems, technology, or prod-
ucts.”92 
In March 2005, the FCC stated that it would consider re-
quests for waiver of the prohibition on integrated devices for 
limited capability integrated digital cable boxes only. Requests 
for such waivers were to include full specifications of the de-
vice.93 The grant of these waivers has caused a significant de-
bate in the past several years as some claim that it impedes the 
purpose of Section 629.94 
In March 2010, the FCC released a National Broadband 
Plan (NBP), which discusses difficulties in implementing the 
CableCARD standard.95 In April 2010, the FCC then issued a 
notice of inquiry (NOI) seeking comments on specific steps the 
FCC can take to “unleash competition in the retail market for 
smart, STB devices that are compatible with all multichannel 
video programming distributor services.”96 In addition, the FCC 
                                                          
 89. Id. at 6799 para. 14. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 526 F.3d 763 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Charter 
Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 460 F.3d 31 (D.C. Cir. 2006); General Instrument Corp. v. 
FCC, 213 F.3d 724 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 92. 47 C.F.R. § 76.1207 (2009). 
 93. See Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Order on Reconsidera-
tion, 14 FCC Rcd. 7596, 7603 para. 15 (1999). 
 94. See Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 26, at 28. 
 95. See CONNECTING AMERICA, supra note 7, at 50–52. 
 96. See Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Notice of Inquiry, CS 
Docket No. 97-80 (Apr. 21, 2010), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-60A1.pdf. 
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issued a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking where it pro-
poses new rules for the CableCARD regime in the interim “un-
til the successor solution becomes effective.”97 It seems appar-
ent that the FCC will be concerned with creating and enforcing 
STB rules for years to come. Appendix 1 outlines the chronolo-
gy of STB proceedings to date. 
There have been over 30 FCC Notices and more than 6,000 
filings in the STB rulemaking.98 Two sides in the proceeding 
may be said to be largely represented by the Consumer Elec-
tronics Association (CEA),99 pushing regulators to create rules 
enabling a retail market in STBs, and the National Cable and 
Telecommunications Association (NCTA),100 opposing such reg-
ulatory efforts. 
B. CABLECARD AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE MARKET 
By July 1, 2007, cable providers were ordered to begin se-
parating the security and access features of their STBs. The 
first CableCARD device became available from third party 
manufacturers in August 2004. The CableCARD is a plug-in 
module (similar in appearance to a credit card) that allows con-
sumers to access, view, and record digital cable TV channels 
without the use of an STB. Customers obtain CableCARDs by 
subscribing to a cable provider. They may then insert the card 
into their TV (assuming the TV has a slot for the card), an STB, 
a personal video recorder, or other electronic device. The card 
“unlocks” the channels and services to which the cable custom-
er has subscribed. 
The CableCARD standard was developed by CableLabs, a 
research consortium modeled on the old Bell Labs, but owned 
by the leading cable TV companies. Host devices that use Cab-
leCARDS must be certified as compliant by CableLabs. Cable 
companies, in turn, make their networks compatible with Cab-
                                                          
 97. Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Fourth Further Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking, CS Docket No. 97-80 (Apr. 21, 2010), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-61A1.pdf. 
 98. Electronic Comment Filing System, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, 
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/proceeding/view?z=v0oml&name=97-80 (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2010). 
 99. Members of Consumer Electronics Association (CEA) manufacture 
consumer electronics. 
 100. Members of National Cable and Telecommunications Association 
(NCTA) manufacture cable TV systems. 
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leCARDs and host devices certified by CableLabs.101 Such 
stand-alone devices, however, lack many functionalities of the 
traditional cable STB, including video-on-demand, subscriber 
guides, and other interactive features. As of June 2009, 29 ven-
dors had 600 unidirectional digital cable-ready models (such as 
Digital Cable Ready DTV sets) approved for use with Cable-
CARD,102 as well as eight thru2way devices.103 Actually selling 
and deploying such devices, so as to create a new third-party 
market, is quite another matter, as discussed in the Empirical 
Evidence section below. 
IV. POLICY-INDUCED COMPETITION 
A. FAULHABER’S FRAMEWORK 
Gerald Faulhaber has examined a range of important cases 
in which policy makers have sought to open telecommunica-
tions markets to competition.104  He focuses on policy interven-
tions that require regulators to police the standards or terms 
used for market access, much as has been done in the FCC’s 
implementation of CableCARD. The traditional rationale, dat-
ing to Carterfone, is to competitively discipline a service market 
monopolist in its primary market or in markets for comple-
ments. The problem is that, for rivalry that does not entirely 
displace the incumbent in the underlying service market, en-
trants will be forced to deal (“interconnect” in telecommunica-
tions jargon) with the service provider they seek to compete 
with. Examining the record, Faulhaber concludes that such 
rules may be successful in nurturing competition if either one 
of two conditions are met: 
1. The market boundary is simple to define and easy to 
monitor; 
 
                                                          
 101. Chris Kohler, CableCard Swipes at Set-Top Boxes, WIRED (Aug. 30, 
2006), http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/08/71682. 
 102. CABLELABS CERTIFICATION AND QUALIFICATION, 
http://www.cablelabs.com/certqual/ (last visited May 27, 2010). 
 103. The tru2way® brand is the cable industry's common software platform 
for two-way digital TV devices.  It establishes a common software platform 
that enables cable companies, content developers, network programmers, con-
sumer electronics companies, and others to extend interactivity to the televi-
sion set and many other devices. See Brand Guidelines, THRU2WAY (Feb. 27, 
2008), http://www.tru2way.com/downloads/tru2way_PrelimGuidelines.pdf. 
 104. See Faulhaber, supra note 1, at 73-97. 
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2. The monopolist is enjoined from operating in the newly 
competitive market.105 
Faulhaber applies this hypothesis to the FCC’s adoption of 
policies designed to induce competition into the customer pre-
mises equipment (CPE) market of direct concern in Carterfone. 
These policies allowed new entrants to enter monopolized seg-
ments of a sector where the basic service (local telephone ser-
vice) would remain monopolized after the entry occurred. To 
induce competition, FCC policies had to specify and police the 
technical interface between different parts of the Bell System, 
specifically designing a modular plug-in layer where non-Bell 
phone equipment could interconnect to access the network. 
The government is here trying to take certain functions 
outside the firm, for competitive reasons, tempering the vertic-
al integration of an established service provider. This effort can 
be examined though the lens of the theory of the firm,106 which 
suggests that the following transactions are most efficiently 
done within the firm: 
• Those that involve long-term assets; 
• Those that have significant information requirements; 
and 
• Those requiring complex and ongoing coordination.107 
The FCC’s CPE policy was to move an important boundary 
between complements outside of the Bell monopoly; the regu-
lated interface would make it difficult for the firm to not coope-
rate with independent rivals (CPE vendors) without depreciat-
ing the value of its own system (and its revenues). This 
approach ultimately proved successful.108 The border between 
the network and the CPE had already been largely defined by 
Bell engineers and was not difficult to describe or police. The 
cost of compliance with the standards was relatively low. Com-
petition was, therefore, invigorated in the ancillary (equipment, 
not service) market.109 
 The CPE example shares structural similarity with the 
                                                          
 105. Id. at 77. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 78. 
 108. See generally Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules 
and Regulations, 77 F.C.C. 2d 384, 447 (1980). See also Customer Premises 
Equipment, CYBERTELECOM, http://www.cybertelecom.org/ci/cpe.htm (last vi-
sited Oct. 31, 2010). 
 109. See Faulhaber, supra note 1, at 78. 
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cable STB effort.  Both concern efforts to introduce equipment 
competition by imposing a regulated interface between devices 
and a communications network. The economic facts differ wide-
ly, however.  First, there is no monopoly today in cable analog-
ous to that existing in the Bell System. While cable operators 
demonstrated substantial market power in the 1980s and 
1990s, competitive entry by satellite operators and telephone 
carriers have forced cable systems to compete across three re-
tail services—video, voice, and data. The upshot is that above-
competitive profits, apparent two decades ago, have disap-
peared when the market valuations of cable (or telephone car-
rier rivals) are examined.110 
Second, the cable network is not price-regulated. This is 
key because when a network operates under rate of return reg-
ulation, it has an economic interest in pushing profits into an 
ancillary (unregulated) market as AT&T did.111 Cable TV sys-
tems were price-regulated under the 1992 Cable Act, but these 
controls were lifted by statute in the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996.112 Hence, guarding against cross-subsidy incentives 
disappears as a rationale for regulation. 
Third, the CableCARD interface is not the simple, efficient 
border found between the telephone network and a registered 
jack, but a complicated, dynamically evolving commercial prod-
uct. There are over 1,000 cable providers. These firms use 
many different technologies or architectures to offer a wide ar-
ray of different services (such as HD, DVR, 3-D and interactive 
services and applications).113 Cable operators do not own STB 
suppliers, companies such as Motorola, Cisco, Thomson, Sam-
sung, Panasonic, Pace, and TiVo, but must cooperate with them 
                                                          
 110. Hazlett & Weisman, supra note 20. 
 111. This served as the rationale for line of business restrictions, in fact, 
keeping the post-divestiture Regional Bell Operating Companies out of equip-
ment, long distance, and information services markets. See Timothy Brennan 
& Karen Palmer, Comparing the Costs and Benefits of Diversification by Regu-
lated Firms, 6 J. REG. ECON. 115, 115–36 (1994). 
 112. See THOMAS W. HAZLETT & MATTHEW L. SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY 
TOWARD CABLE TELEVISION: THE ECONOMICS OF RATE CONTROLS 140–41 
(1997). 
 113. See Industry Data, NCTA, http://www.ncta.com/Statistics.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2010). There are five major cable companies and many smaller 
ones. See Residential Voice, Data, and Video Services Market Highlights, 
INFONETICS RESEARCH, http://www.infonetics.com/pr/2009/Residential-Voice-
Data-Video-Services-Market-Highlights.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2010) (noting 
that “the market is dominated by AT&T, Verizon, and Comcast in the US and 
Bell Canada and Rogers in Canada”). 
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in the production of complementary services even as these box 
makers simultaneously cooperate with cable’s rivals (satellite 
and telco TV operators). 
In contrast, the Bell System was a uniform entity operat-
ing under AT&T’s standards, one of which had already defined 
the plug interface between telephones and the network.  AT&T 
itself supplied CPE to end users via a wholly-owned subsidiary, 
Western Electric,114 and created standards for both network 
and CPE design via another subsidiary, Bell Labs.  While regu-
lators allowed the Bell System to continue selling CPE equip-
ment in competition with independent vendors, the market 
boundary was simple and easily policed. Faulhaber, following 
the conventional wisdom, finds that the regulation was success-
ful.115 
Despite private sector investment that may run into the 
billions of dollars to develop CableCARD and to make the asso-
ciated cable TV network upgrades,116 the retail market for 
STBs remains nascent. As in the telephone CPE structure, ca-
ble operators are not enjoined from operating in the market 
and continue to purchase STBs from suppliers, reselling them 
in service bundles. While it appears clear that imposing line-of-
business restrictions to eliminate this integration (boxes and 
services) would prove highly disruptive (presumably the ratio-
nale for the FCC avoiding this path), it also leaves either of the 
(separately) necessary pre-conditions for successful policy-
induced competition unmet. So far, the empirical result is con-
sistent with the theory. 
B. THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS 
IN THE REGULATION OF NAVIGATION DEVICES 
The FCC’s National Broadband Plan, some 376 pages in 
length, was released in March 2010.117 Among the many policy 
questions analyzed, the plan discusses the CableCARD pro-
ceeding in some detail. It documents that the effort to develop a 
                                                          
 114. Western Electric, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Western_Electric (last modified Sept. 27, 2010). 
 115. See Faulhaber, supra note 1, at 79. 
 116. See Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Comments of National 
Cable and Telecommunications Association on NBP Public Notice #27, CS 
Docket No. 97-80 (Dec. 22, 2009). 
 117. CONNECTING AMERICA, supra note 7, at 50–52. 
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robust retail marketplace for STBs has proven a failure.118 It 
notes that the top two cable STB manufacturers, Motorola and 
Cisco, together captured a 95 percent share of unit shipments 
over the first three quarters of 2009. That is up from 87 percent 
in 2006. The NBP contrasted the cable STBs retail market to 
the robust competition in wireless handsets, stating that while 
only 11 STBs have been certified for retail sale, more than 850 
unique handsets were certified to operate on U.S. mobile net-
works in 2009 alone.119 
The fact that the FCC finds the mobile handsets market 
highly competitive is itself an important data point. First, simi-
larly to the cable STB market, the market for mobile phones 
features active involvement by service providers. Most hand-
sets (like STBs) are purchased in service bundles offered by 
networks. Due to competition in services and technologies, 
wireless networks offer distinct handset choices; in some in-
stances, makes or models are exclusive to a particular network. 
Customers therefore tend to select services and handsets as a 
combination, even when the items are sold separately.  But 
they are typically sold in bundles. Most mobile providers offer a 
free mobile telephone when a client signs a contract (usually 2-
year) with them.120  Similarly, most cable STB customers lease 
their equipment from the cable provider.121 
Ironically, while noting that CableCARD has failed to 
achieve its policy goal, the NBP recommends that the FCC pro-
ceed to ensure that all MVPDs (not just cable operators) install 
a CableCARD-type gateway device. This extends the failed pol-
icy, mandating “openness” in devices even for emerging compet-
itors attempting to take market share from cable TV incum-
bents. The new goal would start to replace STBs in non-cable 
MVPD homes starting before January 1, 2013.122 
                                                          
 118. Id. at 50. 
 119. Id. at 18. 
 120. See, e.g., Free Phones Cell Phone Sales, AT&T, 
http://www.wireless.att.com/cell-phone-service/cell-phone-sales/promotion/free-
phones.jsp (last visited Jan. 22, 2011); Online Exclusive! Free Phones, 
VERIZON, http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/promo/splash/ewp?v=16 (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2011); View Our Free Cell Phone Deals, T-MOBILE, 
http://www.t-mobile.com/shop/phones/?priceRange=0-0 (last visited Jan. 22, 
2011). 
 121. See CONNECTING AMERICA, supra note 7, at 18. 
 122. Id. at 51. 
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V. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
A. FAILURE OF SET-TOP BOX RULES TO CREATE A NEW MARKET 
Despite the FCC’s 14-year regulatory effort to make STBs 
available through retail stores such as Best Buy or Wal-Mart, 
the vast majority of cable navigation devices are yet supplied 
by video service providers as part of standard service bun-
dles.123  Counting only those CableCARD-enabled boxes pur-
chased or leased since the “integration ban” kicked in on July 1, 
2007, some 19,532,000 were supplied to household subscribers 
by cable TV operators, as against 489,000 purchased from re-
tail outlets.124 Furthermore, given that before the “integration 
ban” all STBs were without the mandated interface, the actual 
universe of cable operator-supplied boxes is much larger—
about 61.6 million households. In addition, as Figure 1 demon-
strates, the percentage of CableCARD subscribers has re-
mained below 1 percent of the total cable subscriber base. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 123. See, e.g., Motorola, Inc. Annual Report, 9 (Feb. 26, 2010), available at 
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ABEA-
2FO3VV/914904892x0x351222/A609D0EB-D868-4605-A227-
D190A0BE17B4/2009_Motorola_10K_Final_clean_no_banners_.pdf. 
 124. These data are for the top ten U.S. cable operators, by subscriber size.  
They count sales through February or early March, 2010 (depending on opera-
tor) as reported to the National Cable & Telecommunications Association 
(NCTA).  See NCTA, Re: CS Docket No. 97-80 (Commercial Availability of Na-
vigation Devices), (March 31, 2010), available at  
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020399857. 
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FIGURE 1. CABLECARD SUBSCRIBERS125 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In other words, despite the earnest regulatory efforts, ad-
ministrative expense, and considerable private sector engineer-
ing cost, the policy initiative leaves between 97.5 percent to 
over 99 percent126 of STBs distributed just the way they were 
prior to the rules. Hence, the FCC’s conclusion that the Cable-
CARD standard has “failed to stimulate a competitive retail 
market for set-top boxes.”127 
This lack of market development can also be seen in Table 
1, which shows the top five cable TV operators in the United 
States, accounting for over 80 percent of industry sales. None of 
the five companies sees more than 1.3 percent of its subscribers 
using retail-purchased STBs. The firms also report that they 
charge customers to use CableCARD-enabled devices, from 
                                                          
 125. Id.  Data from quarterly reports submitted to the FCC, although firms 
report sales as of different days. See, e.g., Top 25 Multichannel Video Pro-
gramming Distributor as of Jun. 2010, NCTA, 
http://www.ncta.com/Stats/TopMSOs.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 2010) (listing 
system subscribers); Basic Video Customers, NCTA, 
http://www.ncta.com/Stats/BasicCableSubscribers.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 
2010) (listing total subscribers from 1975 to 2009). 
 126. 489,000 equals 0.8% of 62.1 million, which is total cable subscriber-
ship as of year-end 2009. See Basic Video Customers, NCTA, 
http://www.ncta.com/Stats/BasicCableSubscribers.aspx (last visited Oct. 31, 
2010). 
 127. See CONNECTING AMERICA, supra note 7, at 50. 
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$1.50 to $2.55 per month (per card). Moreover, cable techni-
cians must generally install the so-called “plug-n-play” boxes, 
which results in additional costs for operators and fees for sub-
scribers. 
 
Table 1. Set-Top Boxes Distributed by Cable Systems v. 
Retailers128 
 Cable-
CARD 
subscrip-
tions  
Fee 
per 
month 
Instal-
lation 
Fee 
Total 
Subscrib-
ers 
%  Cable-
CARD 
Cablevision 20,656 $2.00 $34.95 3,063,000 0.0067 
Charter 30,938  $2.00 $35.00 4,824,000 0.0064 
Comcast 296,967  $1.50 $25.00 23,559,00
0 
0.0126 
Cox 42,818 $1.99 $24.00 5,195,000 0.0082 
Time 
Warner 
48,048 $2.55 $26.01 12,859,00
0 
0.0037 
 
B. THE EVOLUTION OF THIRD-PARTY SET-TOP BOXES FOR 
SATELLITE TV 
Although Section 629 applies to all MVPDs, the FCC has 
mandated an integration ban only for cable TV STBs.129 This 
difference has been appropriate, the FCC argues, because DBS 
STBs have been available at retail outlets while cable STBs 
have not been.130  Yet, the unbundled model, which was once 
the standard in the early days of satellite TV, has evolved: to-
                                                          
 128. Letter from National Cable & Telecommunication Association to Mar-
lene H. Dortch, FCC (March 31, 2010) (on file with Minnesota Journal of Law, 
Science & Technology). 
 129. See CONNECTING AMERICA, supra note 7, at 67 n.105 (stating that the 
FCC directly exempted satellite operators, e.g. DirecTV and DISH Network, 
since they operate throughout the United States and offer devices for retail 
sale through unaffiliated vendors, and certain Internet Protocol TV (IPTV) 
providers, primarily small telephone operatives. AT&T (an IPTV provider) has 
neither requested nor received a waiver for its U-Verse service. Verizon FiOS 
is considered a cable service for regulatory purposes and is not exempted from 
Section 629). 
 130. DISH and DirecTV, however, do not use compatible STB. The same is 
true of AT&T and Verizon, the two major telco TV suppliers. This suggests 
that efforts to disintegrate boxes and network services may be difficult, fruit-
less, or both. 
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day, the overwhelming majority of subscribers to DBS (and 
IPTV) video services rent or purchase STBs from service opera-
tors.131 
When the satellite industry initially began deploying DBS 
services starting in the 1990s, satellite providers utilized exist-
ing local retailers to sell their services and equipment. Circuit 
City, for example, was one of these retailers, receiving a per-
centage of each STB that was sold to consumers in addition to a 
percentage of the subscription fees the DBS provider was 
charging.132 DBS providers relied on such retailers because 
they, in contrast to cable operators, had no presence in the local 
market. Cable providers, therefore, did not rely on independent 
retail stores to supply subscribers’ equipment or to market 
their services; DBS did. The initial structure for satellite relied 
on industry standards, tailored to the two national service pro-
viders’ systems, but featured independent customer purchases 
of boxes. Many vendors competed, including RCA, Sony, Toshi-
ba, Zenith, General Instruments (now owned by Motorola), and 
Thomson (renamed Technicolor). 
Yet, over time, bundled bargains offered by satellite pro-
viders began appearing and independent sales of DBS boxes 
declined and then vanished.  It is not plausible that market 
power explains the migration in market structure, for the sim-
ple reason that neither DirecTV nor EchoStar possessed such 
power. Moreover, the DBS-wide migration, observed simulta-
neously for both standards, is consistent with only an efficiency 
explanation: DBS providers bundled boxes to increase market 
share against cable operators. The fact that they have been 
highly successful in this effort is further evidence of efficiency 
and against the hypothesis that the market restructuring was 
output-restricting, the sine qua non of monopolistic behavior 
(See Figure 2). 
 
 
 
                                                          
 131. It is sometimes the case that retailers serve as the sales agents, but 
the purchase package is determined by the operator in that there is little or no 
“mixing and matching” of components within the service package. Customers 
simply subscribe to the service through the retailer, with the network deter-
mining the STB configuration. 
 132. Interview with Stephen Effros, President of Effros Communications 
and formerly Head of the Cable Telecommunications Association (CATA), 
which later merged with NCTA (May 3, 2010). 
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Figure 2. Cable vs. DBS Subscribers (1993-2008)133 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
That satellite TV providers tried the unbundled model and 
then abandoned that in favor of the bundled approach suggests 
that integration of the video service package can be, and has 
been, efficient. In attempting to create an independent retail 
STB market for cable devices, the FCC produces its own evi-
dence of this fact: no independent market has sprung to life. 
Were major new advantages available to customers from direct 
                                                          
 133. 13th Annual Report to Congress - Delivery of Video Programming, 24 
FCC Rcd 542, 684 (FCC 2009); Annual Assessment of the Status of Competi-
tion in Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming, 13 FCC Rcd 1034 
(1998) (Providing data for years 1993–1997); Annual Assessment of the Status 
of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of Video Programming, 17 FCC Rcd 
1244 (2002) (Providing data for years 1997–2001); Families and Living Ar-
rangements, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam.html (last visited Nov. 21, 
2010); Larry Hettick, MSO v. DBS v. Telco: 2008 Winners and Losers by the 
Numbers, CURRENT ANALYSIS (Mar. 20, 2009),  
http://www.currentanalysis.com/d/2009/ctia/ctia-ar-7.asp; Industry Data, su-
pra note 113; Projections of Households by Type: 1995 to 2010, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/population/projections/nation/hh-
fam/table1n.txt (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 
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purchases via third parties, such sales would presumably ma-
terialize. Not only is it ironic that, having failed in cable, which 
is the dominant segment of the MVPD market, the FCC is now 
pushing its video “gateway” rules further, proceeding to un-
bundle boxes from video services offered by entrants DBS and 
telco TV. Even more remarkable is that the effort may deter 
the competitiveness of the new rivals which, in the case of DBS, 
are designed as one-way (download) services rather than inter-
active communications networks: 
DIRECTV has stated that the FCC’s gateway proceeding is misguided 
because mandating an AllVid gateway in the home favors cable’s two-
way architecture and disadvantages satellite providers, who, unlike 
cable providers, are adding Internet capabilities to their boxes.134 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite a lengthy regulatory attempt by the FCC to im-
plement a workable regime for creating a retail market for ca-
ble STBs, such market has not developed. Moreover, the stated 
concern driving this regulatory initiative, that bundling cable 
STBs with MVPD services impairs competition in either video 
or STBs, appears unwarranted. The attempt by competitive en-
trants, notably satellite TV providers, to operate with unbun-
dled boxes was itself a dead-end; market evolution brought 
STBs back into the service provider’s product bundle. Lacking 
market power, these firms ostensibly integrated to pursue effi-
ciencies, not foreclosure. 
A recent report by a consumer-oriented web page summa-
rizes the curious history of STB regulations: 
In 1996, Congress directed the Federal Communications Commission 
to make it easier for consumers to buy set-top boxes from third-party 
providers, potentially eliminating monthly lease fees. In fact, the re-
verse has occurred—consumers are paying more tack-on, set-top fees 
than ever. And an FCC ruling in 2007 is blamed for pushing leasing 
prices higher. That year, pay TV providers were forced to separate 
their channel changing and channel security functions in their set-top 
boxes, a move that was supposed to provide an opening for alternative 
boxes. Consumers who wanted to buy their own simply had to insert a 
CableCARD—similar to PCMCIA cards that were once common to 
laptops—provided by the pay TV firm. But the so-called “integration 
ban,” cable industry officials said, simply raised the cost of making 
boxes, an increase that was passed on to consumers.135 
                                                          
 134. Tim Doyle, Set-Top Innovation Could Precede FCC Rules, SNL.COM 
(May 21, 2010, 10:08 
AM), http://www.snl.com/interactivex/article.aspx?CDID=A-11212940-13877. 
 135. See Bob Sullivan, Set-Top TV Boxes: What Do You Pay?, THE RED 
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The recently released NBP outlines the shortcomings of the 
current regime, but perversely proposes new, broader regula-
tions governing converter boxes. The empirical evidence, how-
ever, suggests that such an effort will not advance competitive-
ness in the marketplace, but deter it. 
 
                                                          
TAPE CHRONICLES (Apr. 20, 2010, 8:00 AM), 
http://redtape.msnbc.com/2010/04/settop-box-rental-prices-going-up.html (em-
phasis added). 
121_GRIGOROVA-MINCHEV.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2011  8:11 AM 
2011] POLICY-INDUCED COMPETITION 307 
APPENDIX 1 
CHRONOLOGY OF FCC SET-TOP BOX PROCEEDING 97-
80136 
Date Type  Description 
2/20/1997 NPRM In this proceeding the FCC sought comment 
on the implementation of section 629 of the 
Communications Act, entitled “Competitive 
Availability of Navigation Devices.” Section 
629, which was added to the Communications 
Act as part of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 instructs the FCC to: 
 
Adopt regulations to assure the commercial 
availability, to consumers . . . of equipment 
used . . . to access multichannel video pro-
gramming and other services offered over 
multichannel video programming systems, 
from manufacturers, retailers, and other 
vendors not affiliated with any multichannel 
video programming distributor.137 
 
In this NPRM, the FCC states that the rules 
under this section shall cease to apply when 
the Commission determines that the markets 
involved are competitive and that elimination 
of the regulations would be in the public in-
terest. Further, the FCC proposed the basic 
principle that equipment that is not part of a 
multichannel video programming distribu-
tors’ (MVPD’s) network distribution plan may 
be acquired by subscribers and attached to 
the network limited only by the requirement 
that any such equipment attached to a 
MVPD’s network not cause it any harm. 
 
The FCC also inquired about what is the best 
definition of “commercial availability” of na-
vigation equipment. 
                                                          
 136. See Electronic Comment Filing System, supra note 6. 
 137. 47 U.S.C. § 549 (2006). 
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Date Type  Description 
6/24/1998 Report 
and Order 
This Order adopts rules and policies implementing 
section 629: 
The FCC determined that open video system opera-
tors are not covered as a consequence of the specific 
open video system provisions of the Communications 
Act which exclude open video system operators from 
certain regulations applicable to cable operators. 
Subscribers have the right to attach any compatible 
navigation device to a multichannel video program-
ming system. The FCC concluded that the core re-
quirement, to make possible the commercial availabil-
ity of equipment to MVPD subscribers, is similar to 
the Carterfone principle. 
 
Service providers are prohibited from taking actions 
which would prevent navigation devices that do not 
perform conditional access functions from being made 
available by retailers, manufacturers or other unaffi-
liated vendors. 
 
Cable operators and other MVPDs can take the neces-
sary steps to guarantee the security of their systems 
and their programming. The Order reaffirms the pro-
visions of the Communications Act that prohibit the 
manufacture, sale and distribution of equipment de-
signed to allow for the unauthorized reception of ser-
vice. 
 
MVPDs must separate out security functions 
from non-security functions by July 1, 2000. An 
exception is made for navigation devices that operate 
throughout the continental United States and are 
commercially available from unaffiliated sources, 
which includes DBS. 
 
MVPDs may offer devices that have security and 
non-security functions integrated until January 
1, 2005. As of that date, no MVPD shall provide new 
navigation devices for sale, lease, or use that perform 
both conditional access functions and other functions 
in a single integrated device. In the year 2000, once 
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Date Type  Description 
separate security modules are available, the FCC 
would assess the state of the market to determine 
whether that time frame is appropriate and it will re-
view the mechanics of the phase out of boxes that 
have combined security and non-security functions.  
5/14/1999 Order on 
Recon. 
Petitions for reconsideration of the Navigation Devic-
es Order were filed by the Consumer Electronics 
Manufacturers Association (CEMA), the National Ca-
ble Television Association (NCTA), the Telecommuni-
cation Industry Association (TIA), Time Warner, and 
the Wireless Cable Association International (WCA). 
In this Order for Reconsideration the FCC reviewed 
these petitions, reconsidered a decision made in that 
order relating to the application of the rules to analog 
equipment, but otherwise reaffirmed the Navigation 
Devices Order.  
9/18/2000 Further 
Notice 
This Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Dec-
laratory Ruling addressed two separate but related 
matters regarding the Commission’s navigation devic-
es rules. The navigation devices rules were adopted to 
implement Sec. 629 of the Communications Act. In 
adopting these rules, the FCC indicated that it would 
monitor the development of commercial availability of 
navigation devices and on reconsideration stated that 
it would commence a proceeding in the year 2000 to 
review the effectiveness of the rules and consider any 
necessary changes. In this proceeding, the FCC un-
dertook that review. In addition, questions were 
raised as to whether certain of the mechanisms being 
developed by the cable television industry relating to 
the copying of digital video programming comply with 
the existing rules.  
1/10/2003 Further 
Notice 
In this Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking the 
FCC sought comment on the Memorandum of Under-
standing (MOU) which details an agreement on a ca-
ble compatibility standard for an integrated unidirec-
tional digital cable television receiver, as well as other 
unidirectional digital cable products. Such standard 
would allow consumers to directly attach their DTV 
receivers to cable systems and receive cable television 
services without the need for an external navigation 
device. On December 19, 2002 the members of the dis-
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Date Type  Description 
cussion group, headed by the Consumer Electronics 
Association (CEA) and the National Cable and Tele-
communications Association (NCTA) reached the 
MOU.  
4/25/2003 Order This Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing extends the deadline concerning the prohibition on 
integrated devices until July 1, 2006.  
12/23/2003 Order To prevent an unintended consequence in creating 
disparity between MVPDs, the FCC revised the defi-
nition of Unencrypted Broadcast Television in the 
FCC’s encoding rules.  
3/17/2005 Order The FCC extended the phase-out of integrated STBs 
effectively until July 1, 2007. The FCC also stated 
that it was “not persuaded” that the current level of 
competition in the navigation device market is suffi-
cient to assure the commercial availability of naviga-
tion devices to consumers from sources other than 
multichannel video programming distributors 
(MVPDs).  
10/3/2005 Order The FCC extended the deadline for the first joint re-
port regarding progress on the negotiation of a bidi-
rectional agreement between the NTCA and CEA to 
October 14, 2005. 
 
12/23/2005 Order The FCC granted additional time to Hewlett Packard, 
Intel and ATI Technologies to file comments in re-
sponse to a report filed by the cable industry on the 
feasibility of implementing software-based conditional 
access in navigation devices.  
2007-2009 Waiver 
Requests 
Various requests for waivers of the requirement for 
integrated STB phasing out were filed by different 
companies.  
03/16/2010 n/a National Broadband Plan released. The purpose of the 
plan was to reveal FCC’s plans for the future. With 
respect to cable STBs, the plan discusses in some de-
tail the difficulty of the CableCARD standard to de-
velop a robust retail marketplace for STBs.138 
  
                                                          
 138. See CONNECTING AMERICA, supra note 7, at 50–52. 
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04/21/2010 NOI The NOI seeks comment on specific steps the FCC can 
take to “unleash competition in the retail market for 
smart, set-top video devices (“smart video devices”) 
that are compatible with all multichannel video pro-
gramming distributor (MVPD) services.” The Com-
mission wants to explore the potential for allowing 
any electronics manufacturer to offer smart video de-
vices at retail that can be used with the services of 
any MVPD and without the need to coordinate or ne-
gotiate with MVPDs. 
04/21/2010 Further 
Notice 
With this FNPRM the FCC proposes new rules for the 
CableCARD regime in the interim “until the successor 
solution becomes effective.” In the Second Report and 
Order related to navigation devices, rules were 
adopted requiring a specific interface on leased STBs 
to allow recording on digital recording devices. Mul-
tiple parties have raised concerns about whether the 
rule is specific enough to be effective and whether 
other interfaces could equally achieve this purpose. 
The FCC seeks comment on proposed rules to more 
fully specify the functionality of this interface and to 
enable other interfaces as well. 
10/14/2010 Report 
and Order 
on Recon. 
FCC adopted new rules that (1) require cable opera-
tors to support the reception of switched digital video 
services on retail devices; (2) prohibit price discrimi-
nation against retail devices; (3) require cable opera-
tors to allow self-installation of CableCARDs where 
device manufacturers offer device-specific installation 
instructions; (4) require cable operators to provide 
multi-stream CableCARDs by default; and (5) clarify 
that CableCARD device certification rules are limited 
to certain technical features. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
